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Chapter 10:
Concepts, Causes, and the Neglected Third
Party: the Victim of Corruption                    
Gjalt de Graaf, Patrick von Maravic, and
Pieter Wagenaar    
1. Introduction
Corruption: we all have an idea about what it is, and we all have more or less
experience with it. It is an object of research that inspires numerous – and di-
verse, as this book manifestly proves – academic endeavors. While many may
have known that the concept of corruption is essentially contested and its defi-
nitions various, The Good Cause shows that the differences in academia travel
farther and deeper than the differences in definition. Within different discourses
specific ideas exist on what the research questions are, what they should be,
and how knowledge on corruption can be gained. In other words, the differ-
ences are not only on the level of what the object of research is or should be;
the epistemologies within The Good Cause differ profoundly. One example
would be ‘empirical studies’. In institutional economics it translates primarily
to employing a range of clever devices to generate quantitative estimates, but in
criminological studies it means studying actual corruption cases – two entirely
different interpretations within the same area of research. The reason for the
epistemological differences has also become clear: the underlying ontologies
are different. In some areas of corruption research – the Rose-Ackerman chap-
ter for example – the ontology is not part of the (mostly positivist) research; in
other areas, like the Hiller, and the De Graaf, Wagenaar, and Hoenderboom
chapters, it is. In a sense, therefore, corruption research reflects social science
research in general. It demonstrates how research in the social sciences and
humanities differs from the beta sciences where paradigm shifts take place, but
not many paradigms exist at the same time. Collier (Collier 2002) is right when
he states that an interdisciplinary theory on the causes of corruption never
emerged. He is also right when he claims that it is because corrupt behavior is
extremely complex social behavior – but even that is only the beginning of the
explanation. Corruption research attracts people whose ideas on what the social
world is are so fundamentally different that a new interdisciplinary approach is
not likely to emerge. It is worth noting here that the various approaches’ units
of analysis also differ widely, a detail discussed later in the chapter.
Beyond the definitions, methodologies, epistemologies, and ontologies,
the concept of ‘causes’ also varies profoundly. In the introduction we dis-
cussed the philosophy of causality, in which we can distinguish epistemo-
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logical and ontological traditions (Schinkel 2004). Here we can say on a
practical level that what some call ‘causes’ of corruption others describe as
‘contributing factors’, ‘motives’, or ‘enhancing circumstances’. And in many
cases it is perhaps better to speak of studies trying to ‘understand’ corruption
rather than to ‘explain’ it (compare Weber 1921). Rose-Ackerman points out
that in most economical studies the consequences of corruption are difficult
to distinguish from the causes; the causal arrow appears to be bi-directional.
In sum (and unsurprisingly), because the differences in approaches are great,
so are the differences in the book’s chapters.
Whereas different paradigms in the beta sciences lead to conflicts until
one is ‘proven right’, in The Good Cause, we find a kind of stalemate. On
one side are universalists, who work with a definition of corruption they as-
sume to be the same everywhere in the world; on the other are particularists,
who have no specific definition of corruption, expect that corruption defini-
tions can differ widely between cultures or social groups, and find benefit in
studying the differences. In the next section we discuss the differences be-
tween the approaches, and follow with sections on their similarities. We con-
clude by pointing at blind spots in existing corruption research and discussing
the (im)possibility of finding an ultimate remedy.
2. Understanding and Researching Corruption
Weberian approaches use ideal-type guided research, comparative, and histori-
cal research. Causes of corruption are located in the wider context of a specific
form of domination and personal rulership (cf. Rubinstein/von Maravić, this
volume). An explicit understanding and legally-sanctioned definition of
corruption comes into existence with the separation of private household and
public office, which occurs with the rise of a bureaucratic system; the legal-
rational system is dominated by an explicit rule system that sanctions the use of
public power for private means. The unit of analysis is the system of govern-
ance. Corruption occurs when one system slowly makes way for another.
F.W. Riggs’s theory is Weberian in the sense that corruption is typical of
a developing society, especially in his use of ideal types, but he veers off
from Weber by taking a structural-functionalist approach. According to
Riggs, societies consist of structures with functions. ‘Fused’ societies have
very few structures, each of which fulfills many functions. ‘Diffracted’ so-
cieties are the opposite, i.e., they have many structures fulfilling few func-
tions each. Corruption occurs in the intermediate stage of development – in
the ‘prismatic’ society – from the friction between the fused and diffracted
logic. Riggs then explains the peculiar logic of such prismatic societies and
shows how fused practices are often hidden behind diffracted facades.
In terms of institutional economics, corruption occurs where private
wealth and public power overlap; institutional frameworks determine the na-
Gjalt de Graaf, Patrick von Maravic, and Pieter Wagenaar168
ture and the extent of its opportunities. The units of analysis can be countries,
organizations or individuals, even though economic theory is poorly
equipped to explain variation across individuals who face the same structural
incentives. Preferred research techniques are survey methods and experi-
ments.
The multi-approach by definition uses a multitude of levels, analyses, and
all possible research methods. Beginning with one (classic) definition of cor-
ruption – the abuse of (public) authority for private benefit – it is the most
comprehensive attempt of all the approaches in this book to arrive at an in-
terdisciplinary framework. At the country level, for example, corruption is
related to political, economic, and social macro circumstances. This frame-
work observes causes of corruption at all possible levels.
Systems theory has a very distinct approach. Corruption is seen as the
linkage of different horizons of meaning in social communication. The re-
search question stemming from it is how the linkages of meaning come
about. Corruption arises when organizations (networks, groups, individuals)
assigned to particular functional contexts fail to uphold the appropriate func-
tional logic in their decisions. How is the corruption observed? By whom? –
These are the possible research questions with which to start. We can think of
studying the structural conditions that must be observed for a phenomenon to
become the subject of a moral discourse and for corruption to be potentially
labeled reprehensible.
Institutional design looks primarily at meso and macro levels. Differences
between regimes represent different sets of institutions that may (or may not)
be able to constrain behavior. The concept of corruption captures behavior
that is beyond the pale of what is commonly accepted in industrialized de-
mocracies; behavior that undermines fairness and probity in governing makes
it apparent to the public that appropriate standards of integrity are not being
followed by public officials. Some doubts remain about the relevance of
macro-level political structures for explaining corruption: the basic outcome
of Peters’ analysis in this book is that any simple understanding of institu-
tions as structures or rule systems is incapable of shedding much light on the
likelihood of good governance. According to Peters so much difference exists
between the regime types that making predictions is next to impossible. The
causal linkage between institutional structures and the behavior of individuals
within them is so attenuated that attempting to explain corruption on an indi-
vidual level is difficult.
De Graaf, Wagenaar, and Hoenderboom state that, from a constructivist
perspective, any interpretation of corruption and its causes is contestable.
Some overlap with the Hiller chapter is clear. Their unit of analysis is dis-
course, not (corrupt) agents on the individual level, and they study the effects
of texts on other texts. Included in this approach are historical and genealogi-
cal studies that illustrate how discourses on corruption are always socially
and historically constructed.
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Criminological approaches look at corruption as deviating from legal
standards. Several criminological theories exist, but most employ three ele-
ments at three levels: motivation, opportunity, and control at the individual,
organizational, and environmental levels. Units of analysis are both individu-
als and organizations, sometimes even the state. The empirical studies in this
approach turn out to be unexpectedly limited, dealing mostly with the role of
organized crime in corruption. Data used for research are partly produced by
law enforcement agencies and gathered directly from offenders or victims.
Most corruption research in criminology is thus qualitative in the form of in-
terviews, participant observation, and case-studies.
3. Corruption and Morality
One of the similarities in the different academic discourses that struck us is
the agreement that corruption, both conceptually and empirically, has a clear
moral connotation. Rose-Ackerman for example points out that where some
institutional economists claim to be purely positive, their analyses also con-
tain normative aspects. Hiller writes that the social observation of corruption
is a matter of moral communication. All researchers, regardless of their ap-
proach, seem to agree that the phenomenon they study is part of a moral dis-
course. De Graaf, Wagenaar, and Hoenderboom point out that by describing
discourse on corruption, moral aspects come to the fore. Hiller even goes so
far as to state that the moral observation of corruption is one of the most ex-
citing areas of corruption research.
Moral norms change over time and place, but corruption – whatever it is –
is always considered reprehensible. People disagree about the norms that de-
termine whether someone is corrupt, not about the concept’s reprehensive-
ness. Anyone labeled ‘corrupt’ is judged in a morally negative way. Corrup-
tion is therefore morally loaded – like ‘integrity’, but with an opposite moral
loading. In the De Graaf, Wagenaar, and Hoenderboom chapter attention is
drawn to the consequences of being so labeled. Several Dutch civil servants
convicted for corruption in a court of law admitted they did something
wrong, but denied being ‘corrupt’. As Hiller quotes Fleck and Kuzmicks
(1985: 7): ‘what is considered morally reprehensible and whether certain be-
havior is considered in this way varies from time to time (and from place to
place), but the fact that attributing the label is equivalent to an evaluation is
as good as unaffected by social change.’
Officials can also be certain ‘degrees’ of corrupt. A public official illicitly
receiving €5000 is ‘more’ corrupt than one receiving €500. And, research
shows, people regard a police officer who asks for €20 from a driver to
overlook a speeding ticket as being more corrupt than one who accepts €20
when it is offered to him. A comparison of research on public attitudes to-
wards corruption concludes:
Gjalt de Graaf, Patrick von Maravic, and Pieter Wagenaar170
 ‘Over and over, the research found that respondents judged elected officials more severely
than they judged appointed officials; judges more severely than police officers; bribery and
extortion more harshly than conflict of interest, campaign contribution, and patronage; and
harmful behavior more harshly than petty behavior” (Malec 1993: 16).
The authors of The Good Cause differ on how to deal with morality sur-
rounding corruption. Some start out with a corruption definition, which
means presupposing a clear boundary between right and wrong; others be-
lieve such boundaries vary with cultures. De Zwart points out that in Riggs’s
view, the principles and techniques of modern public administration reflect
the normative structure of Western societies. Corruption is even defined as
normlessness. But of course then the relevant norms become important (cf.
Huberts, this volume). Transplanted to another culture, Western corruption is
still morally wrong in Western eyes, but not in a different normative struc-
ture. De Zwart points to the basic problem of moral relativism: to deny it is
cultural imperialism, but to accept is to ‘tolerate barbarity and atrocity in
those cultures. Damned if we do and damned if we don’t – either way the
prospects are bleak’ (Aya 2004: 31). This is similar to Rose-Ackerman’s
pointing out that the meaning of ‘misuse’ may indeed vary across cultures.
4. Public Corruption and the Outside World
We have noted that in most approaches the relationship between public and
private is important. Most speak of corruption as abuse of public power and
in doing so make a public-private distinction. Collusive public-private rela-
tionships also contribute to corruption. Huisman and Vande Walle ask
whether the legal definition of corruption encompasses the socially injurious
relations between companies. We can ask the same about non-legal defini-
tions.
What we see in many chapters – the one on criminology, for example – is
that close relations between private and public partners contribute to certain
forms of corruption. Huisman and Vande Walle: ‘In comparing lobbying and
corruption Campos and Giovanni have suggested that legal mechanisms such
as lobbying are preferred in rich countries while companies in poor countries
have to rely on corruption’ (Campos/Giovanni 2006). Huisman and Vande
Walle point to Shichor and Geis whose survey on transnational bribery con-
firmed that businessmen often escape disapproval: people think accepting a
bribe is worse than offering a bribe (Shichor/Geis 2007). One explanation for
this underestimation is that criminologists for a long time have shown re-
straint in interfering with private enterprises. The same seems to hold for
most other approaches. For example, Peters points to clientelism, in which a
powerful patron provides his clients favors in exchange for political support
(see also Rubinstein/von Maravić, this volume). Both Rose-Ackerman and
Peters wonder where ‘pork barreling’ ends and corruption begins.
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At present the relations between public and private organizations in most
countries are rapidly changing because of developments like New Public
Management, privatization, outsourcing, hybridization, and public-private
partnerships. Do the increasingly blurred boundaries between public and pri-
vate sectors mean that we can expect more corruption in the future (see Doig
1995, 1997, 1998; Erlingsson et al. 2008; Kolthoff et al. 2007; von Ma-
ravić/Reichard 2003; von Maravić 2007)? And what are the consequences for
corruption studies? After all, most approaches use the public-private distinc-
tion to make the corruption concept clear, instead of victims, and most look
differently at corruption in public versus private organizations. Thus when
the sectors get blurred, the concept changes meaning and, in turn, influences
future research endeavors.
5. Fighting Corruption: Now What?
Different approaches come with different solutions. Weber was interested in
how legitimate political and economic order is created and maintained. His
work illustrates how a society effectively restrains certain forms of behavior
and encourages others. The metaphor of the ‘iron cage’ implies that corrup-
tion occurs when the system of legal-rational dominance is not yet complete;
loopholes remain for the bureaucrat’s private motives. In other words, the
distinction between the private-public role is not clearly delineated, offering a
gateway for deviating behavior that could stem from inexplicit rules, subop-
timal methods of sanctioning and supervision, an inferior system of recruit-
ment, or an organizational ethos that has not been fully penetrated by the of-
ficial structure. A Weberian approach to fighting corruption would therefore
focus on the separation of the public-private domain, the formalization of
rules, and a clear public office ethos. This collectivist vision (Hood 2000: 73-
97; du Gay 2000: 1-13, 136-148) clashes, however, with the global Zeitgeist
of privatizing public functions, deregulating, outsourcing, public-private
partnerships, and other forms of hybrid governance.
Nor does the prismatic view in non-Western countries offer clear anti-
corruption or prevention interventions. We either await normative change, or
accept that administrations are corrupt. There is much skepticism – as with
postmodern and system analytical accounts – about good governance pro-
grams and Western interventions promoted through institutions like the
World Bank. We cannot transplant Western-designed administrative models
and practices into a different normative order and expect them to function.
And although De Zwart points to the work of Johnston, claiming, ‘[f]rom his
work it follows that articulating group interests, stimulating politics, state
formation, and bottom-up organizations can help the ‘good government
cause’’, Rose-Ackerman points out that even documented damage from
grand-corruption can escape the power or political will to be systematically
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changed – another bleak picture. Institutional design does not come with
clear, institutional or otherwise, recommendations on how to prevent corrup-
tion.
Then there are scholars who claim that deep historical factors are the de-
terminants of corruption and that countries cannot escape their history. The
important issue from a policy perspective is whether the factors contributing
to corruption are exogenous or whether people react to others’ behavior. As
with every academic approach, institutional economics wants to address what
it sees as the underlying conditions (factors, causes, incentives) that create
corrupt incidents, meaning promoting incentive-based policy responses like
rearranging the rewards and costs of honest and corrupt behavior. Yet,
‘[c]lever technical solutions, based on economic incentives, may not be enough. If corrup-
tion is one of the pillars supporting a political system, it cannot be substantially reduced
unless an alternative source of revenue replaces it. Powerful groups that lose one source of
patronage will search for another vulnerable sector. Strong moral leadership is necessary
but not sufficient. Tough political and policy choices need to be faced squarely’ (cf. Rose-
Ackerman, this volume).
Hiller concludes that differentiation theory cannot lead to recommendations
on how to combat corruption. Huisman and Vande Walle emphasize the im-
portance of leadership in ethical conduct and corruption prevention. No
chapter disputes this; in fact, every approach that looks at organizational-
level culture makes this point.
Post-positivist students of corruption are also careful with recommending
remedies for corruption. They point to the problem of interpretations of cor-
ruption and the negative side effects of a corruption fight. What they do have
to offer, however, is reflection.
Collier wrote (2002: 2): ‘Additionally, my analysis demonstrates that the
corruption phenomenon is so complex that it can only be addressed through
grassroots changes in a state’s political, economic, and cultural institutions –
changes that are not only technical but also social in nature’. Indeed, no Good
Cause author disagrees with that or suggests catching and punishing ‘rotten
apples’. A conclusion of this book is, however, that agreeing on ‘cause’ is
impossible, let alone a or the cause of corruption – a problem if we want to
conclude with ideas on how to fight it. The many remedies named in this
book are helpful in the sense they can better the design of organizations and
influence cultures in such a way that it lessens corruption. Even so, De Graaf,
Wagenaar, and Hoenderboom warn us about unintended consequences.
Another problem is that the literature suggests many such devices, but
which works under what circumstances at how much of a cost is unclear.
When is a certain type of leadership important? How do we make sure public
ethos continues to support traditional public values? Since these theories do
not offer a premise on the cause(s) of corruption and are based on general re-
search and broad correlations, they do not say much about contingency,
which is so important for social research – especially corruption research be-
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cause of its complexity. This is an important point made by Anechiarico and
Jacobs (1996) in their comprehensive classic study in New York City. The
authors documented and analyzed the manifold liabilities of a vast range of
corruption control projects. They showed how corruption control mecha-
nisms, which might make sense when based on general research, might not
work in a specific context. ‘You name the anticorruption reform, the authors
point out its severe organizational liabilities’ (Silverman 1998: 182). And
how do we fill the gap noted by Van Hulten (2002: 182), who said that al-
most no empirical studies offer conclusions about which anti-corruption
methods work under what circumstances? The literature currently offers
much confusion. ‘The right mix of corruption controls will undoubtedly dif-
fer from governmental unit and from agency to agency within the same gov-
ernmental unit. Moreover, the optimal mix changes over time’ (Anechi-
arico/Jacobs 1996: 198). It is safe to say we know next to nothing about
which corruption controls are most efficient under different circumstances.
Take, for example, the installment of ‘integrity systems’ proposed by Trans-
parency International. Is it successful in preventing corruption? Perhaps.
Gilman (2000) and Huberts (2000) seem to think so. Others, however
(Anechiarico/Jacobs 1996; Brown 1999; Cooper 1998), disagree and would
probably maintain that the programs would be ineffective at best.
The diversity of answers given by the authors in this book is a function of
the empirical complexity of the phenomenon itself, different research foci,
and various epistemological and ontological traditions. It is easy to lament
the cacophony of corruption analyses and the non-unitary state of the social
and behavioral sciences, but this does not help reduce corruption. We should
abandon the idea of a ‘scientific law’ in the sense of Hempel and Oppenheim
(1948: 152), one that has the quality of a ‘true statement’ and forever deter-
mines a ‘treatment’ for corruption.
We do not, however, propose to give up the effort to seek causal knowl-
edge. Reflective causal knowledge is essential for decision makers to adapt to
external challenges, especially to knowledge that indicates manipulable causes.
Causality in the behavioral and social sciences also has a temporal dimension,
which makes causal explanation highly dependent on context. If we are ana-
lytically and practically confronted with such a complex social phenomenon as
corruption, and choose to reflect on it, perhaps the most important contribution
of this book is to remind us that there are different ways of conceptualizing
corruption and we have offered different pathways to reflect critically on our
own approaches. We should always be aware that the type of analytical lens we
choose determines what we will propose to do about corruption. We should
avoid dangerous conceptual lock-ins and getting trapped in the Achilles’ heel
of each strategy. What some might call ‘a bewildering cacophony’ we see as
desirable pluralism enriching the analytical toolbox for phenomena that cannot
be ignored, are complex, and deserve complex answers. No more or less, at
least for the moment, can we take for given.
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What this book clearly shows is that every approach sees different prob-
lems with corruption and has different solutions. Relevant contingencies pro-
hibit us from testing what works under what conditions. Finding one clear
solution remains an illusion. After reading all the chapters, it becomes clear
that the theoretical model chosen to a large degree determines the direction of
the proposed solutions (cf. Peters, this volume). Different causal chains, or
even ideas about causality, lead to different discourses on corruption preven-
tion and corruption control. The logical consequence of multiple causes can
only be multiple answers. But in what combination and what doses? As yet
we do not know, and in the end it depends, despite all attempts to reach uni-
versal answers, on the single case and tailor-made solutions. What can be
said from other fields in which institutional design plays a significant role –
for instance, common-pool resource problems (Ostrom/Walker/Gardner
1994) or grid-group concept (Douglas 1970; cf. also Hood 2000) – is that
sustainable institutional solutions depend on the combination of different in-
stitutional strategies – be they hierarchical, competitive, or trust-based – to
overcome each one’s inherent vulnerability.
Despite all this, we end with a strategy that might help in fighting corrup-
tion. The idea stems from the realization that most research approaches pay
little attention to the victims of corruption except in a very general way, e.g.,
some corruption is related to underdevelopment and poverty, and the poor
generally suffer the most. Little research exists on direct victims of specific
corrupt relationships. Attention to the third party in a corrupt relationship, the
‘end user’ of corruption, is largely missing.
Several approaches mention that those involved in corruption deny doing
or intending harm. Perpetrators try to avoid the concept of ‘corruption’ and
thus disengage their actions from moral discourse. Part of a strategy to fight
corruption is for corruption researchers, whatever their approach, to empha-
size and highlight the moral aspects of corruption and corruption cases. Who,
in the end, is the victim? What, precisely, is the harm? Identifying the victims
and damage gives corruption a face and a voice. And we know from moral
theory that victims who can be seen and heard receive attention.
